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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
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JOYCE WHATCOTT, VIRGE CHRIST- cr 
ENSEN, MAXINE L. ROBISON, 
JESS C. BENNETT, MAUREL J. 
WARNER, GRANTBRUNSO~ 
Plaintiffs, Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MILLARD COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
Defendants, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
of Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss 
A. LEE PETERSEN 
Case No. 
10215 
Attorneys for Respondents and Cross-Appelants 
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IN THE SUP·REME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. G. RICKER, EUGENE McBRIDE, 
CARL PROBERT, JAROLD ROBISON, 
JOYCE WHATCOTT, VIRGE CHRIST-
ENSEN, MAXINE L. ROBISON, 
JESS C. BENNETT, MAUREL J. 
WARNER, GRANT BRUNSON, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE BO ... t\RD OF EDUCATION OF 
MILLARD COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
Defendants, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
10215 
Rehearing is requested on matters pertaining to allo-
cation of bond proceeds only, and not as to matters relat-
ing in any way to the validity of the bond election. 
BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The respondents, S. G. Ricker, et al., respectively sub-
mit that the decision of the Court rendered herein on Nov-
ember 6, 1964, reversing the judgment of the Fifth Judic-
ial District Court, Millard County, constitutes a failure 
of the Court to protect the integrity of the ballot and to 
uphold the concept of checks. and balances in our system 
of government, and it upsets the findings of fact made by 
the above named district court without giving due consid-
eration to them. 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT CONSTI-
TUTES A FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE BAL-
LOT AND TO UPHOLD THE CONCEPT OF 
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN OUR SYSTEM 
OF GOVERNMENT. 
The Court, in its opinion, states: 
As is the case in ether areas in our system of gov-
ernment, it is the citizen's right to vote for and elect 
officials he thinks best quali.ded tc represent his in-
terests. Having so elected the school board, he then 
must trust them to administer the school program. 
But it is not his privilege to intrude directly into the 
management of school affairs. 
Re·spondents do not disagree with the above statement. 
But the court then proceeds to apply the principle of the 
statement to this case by analogizing : 
This principle carries over into the bond election. The 
taxpayers may give or withhold their consent to the 
issuance of bonds and creation of indebtedness. But 
if the consent is given, the disposition of the money 
raised then becomes the responsibility of the board. 
This latter statement is not a fair or proper interpreta-
tion of the law. It, in effe·ct, abrogates the legislative in-
tent behind U.C.A., 1953, Title 53, Chapter 10, which sets 
forth the procedure for creating indebtedness in school 
districts. Respondents infer and submit to the Court that 
2 
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the legislature intended by this law to reserve to the tax-
payers some actual control over the use of their money; 
otherwise the la'\\" would have been unnecessary. 
The la \V provides~ and every intelligent voter under-
stands., that in a bond election the taxpayers give their 
consent to. th~ issuance of bonds and the creation of in-
debtedness for a purpose. The bonding is merely the 
means to accomplish the desired purpose. The taxpayers 
in voting for the issuance of bonds, in effect, say that 
they want so much to accomplish a particular Pl::lrpos·e 
that they are willing to do it by means. of the issuance of 
bonds. But if the purpose for which the indebtedness is 
to be incurred is thwarted by the administering board, 
it can only follow, logically, that the cons;ent to the in-
debtedness is invalid. 
It is the duty of the Court to protect the voters to 
see that the purposes to which they give their consent are 
not thwarted, and the law so provides. U.C.A., 19·53, 53-10-
17 and U.C.A., M53, 20-15-1, et seq. In its, opinion in this 
case the Court fails in its duty of protecting the rights of 
the voters to vote intelligently and meaning:fully on issues. 
The existence of effective checks and balances is fun ... 
damental to our system of government. It is understand ... 
able, however, and certainly proper, that each branch of 
government should exercise great reluctance to encroach 
upon the domain of another branch, because to do so fre-
quently and needlessly would upset the balance. But the 
balance is also susceptible to being upset by faihire of one 
branch to check another when circumstances warrant. 
Respondents submit that in' this case the failure of the 
Court to restrain an administrative board results in im-
balance. The Act of the Legislature is: made meaning-
s 
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less, and the administrative board becomes endowed with 
near omnipotence, so far as this issue is concerned, be-
cause the other branch of government, the Court, chooses 
to ·refrain from the exercise of its power. 
~urely the Court would not hesitate to intervene to. 
protect the will of the voters if one of five elected school 
board members were to usurp all powers. of the other 
four, even if he proceeded to administer the school district 
wisely. Respondent's position is that even though lines 
cannot be so clearly drawn When dealing only \vith is,sues 
and the appropriatin-g o.f funds, rather than '\vith individ-
ual persons, the electors are entitled to substantially the 
same protection of the courts in a vote on issues as. in a 
VQte on office holders. The respondents are not by this 
lawsuit attempting to intrude into the management of the 
school district, which is admittedly the function of the 
school board. They merely ask that when the law provides 
them a right to vote, that their vote be meaningful; that 
the board comply reasonably with the proposition it pre-
sented to the voters; or, if the board does not now deem 
it wise to carry out the· original proposition, that it pre-
sent whateve·r new and different proposition it may wish 
to make to the· voters for a new and meaningful vote. 
POINT II 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT DOES NOT GIVE 
D.UE CONSIDERATION TO THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT MADE BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
It is firmly established law that the Supreme Court 
on review of a decision of a district court should in no 
case disturb the findings of fact of· the district court un-
4 
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less after carefully considering the district court's find-
ings, making due allowances as to the better opportunity 
of the trial court to observe the demeanor of witness·es, 
determine their credibility and weigh their testimony, it 
finds that the trial court's findings are without any evi-
dence to support them; or, in an equity case, that the 
greater weight of the evidence is clearly against the trial 
court's findings. Only if the Supreme Court should find 
that the weight of the evidence is clearly against the- trial 
court's findings of fact may i·t make a new finding or re-
mand the cas.e for further proceedings~ __ Shaw v. Jeppson, 
121 Utah 155, 239 P. 2d 745; Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 
64, 282 Pac. 1034; Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290,. 279 P. 
502;_ Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 980.; 
Ogden Packing & Provisions Company v. Tooele Meat. & 
Stor·age Compa:ny, 41 Utah 92, 124 Pac. 333; Scott v. Aus~ 
tin, 47 Utah 248, 152 Pac. 1178. 
In considering. the findings of fact made by the trial 
court, the Supreme Court must not confine itself to the 
findings stated specifically in the trial court's official 
findings of fact, but must presume that the trial court 
found every fact to support its order that the evidence 
would. justify its finding. And the trial court must be 
presumed to have. drawn against the unsuccessful party. 
every inference· of which the facts and the evidence were 
susceptible. Griffith Company v. San Diego College for 
Women; 45 Cal. 2d 501, 289 P. 2d 476, 47 ALR 2d 1849; 
Thayer v. Shorey, 287 Mass. 96, 191 N.E. 435, 94 ALR 
307; Pacific Coast. Sav. Soc. v. Sturdev.ant, 165 Cat 687, 
133 Pac. 485. 
And this Court has in the past made statements very 
similar to the holdings of the above cas·es, such as : 
5. 
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The plaintiff having prevailed, he is entitled to the 
benefit of the evidence viewed in the light most fav-
orable to him, together _with every inference and in-
tendment fairly and reasonably arising therefrom. 
McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 277. 
In its opinion on this case the Court acknowledges 
that in a case where a board so completely fails to follow 
the course of its duties that its acts may be classified as 
capricious and arbitrary, redress may be had in the 
courts. But it dismisses the possibility of arbitrariness 
and capriciousness in t11is case ·vvith oue b:.~ief senten:2e. 
This., de.s.pite the existence of ample evidence to support a 
finding of arbitrariness and ca pr'iciousness - and despite 
the very apparent finding by the trial court that the acts 
of the board were arbitrary and capricious. These speci-
fic terms were not used in the trial court's memorandum 
of decis:ion, it is logical to assume, for the same· reason 
plaintiff's counsel did ·not insist that they be included in 
the court's written findings of fact: that is, that the trial 
judge and plaintiff's counsel were all hoping to calm 
troubled waters and were reluctant to inject inflamma-
tory terms where they did not seem absolutely ne·cessary 
to a proper decision. N otwithstal,lding that the specific 
terms were not used, the Supreme Court, under the doc-
trine of the cases cited above, must presume that a find-
ing of arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of the 
board was made by the trial court. This presumption is' 
substantiated by statements made by the trial judge dur-
ing the course of the trial -- such as statements to the ef-
fect that he was somewhat concerned about the building 
of a plant to accommodate 900 students in the light of a 
projected enrollment five years hence of 500 students, 
6 
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while other critical needs of the school district remain un-
provided for. (Tr. 181, 196) Further, the trial judge sev-
eral times during the trial cited and expressed his approv-
al of the Kentucky case of Wooley v. Spaulding, 293 S.W. 
2d 563, (Tr. 179), and re·ad from it the following quota-
tion: 
\Vhile we have many times recognized the discretion .. 
ary power of a school board with respect to matters 
within its province, at the same time, in accord with 
all other courts, we have recognized the right of tax-
payers and patrons of schools to challenge the action 
of the school authorities and declared the power of 
the courts to intervene when it appears that a board 
has abused a reasonable discretion and acted arbitrar-
ily or capriciously or as the result of improper influ-
ence. (Italics added) 
Then, after considering all the evidence and law in the 
case, the trial judge did afford redress of the court to the 
plaintiff taxpayers, thus creating the clear inference that 
he found this case to be within the purview of the lan-
guage quoted above. 
As an example of the arbitrary and capricious ac-
tions of the board in this case, the evidence shows that on 
July 19, 1963, the board unanimously adopted and ordered 
published the brochure containing the statement that part 
of the bond proceeds would be used for construction of 
new dis~trict offices in Fillmore. (Tr. 4 and 5) The evi-
dence in the case further shows that on November 6, 1963, 
the board, ·with only three members voting favorably to 
the motion, adopted a resolution to build (presumably 
with bond proceeds) the new district offices in or in con-
nection with the new high school building in Delta. (Tr. 
7 
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16) The board has neve·r claimed that circumstances 
changed in any material way between July and November. 
Consequently, this. act of the board is open to only two lo-
gical inferences: Either the board members intended all 
along to build the district offices in Delta and deceitfully 
offered the prospect of new district offices in Fillmore as 
bait to secure favorable votes on the east side of the dis-
trict, or the board decided arbitrarily and capriciously to 
punish the residents of Fillmore and its neighboring com-
munities be-cause the majority of them voted against the 
bonding proposal. Actually this arbitrary change in lo-
cation of the proposed new district offices is the issue 
which triggered the lawsuit, though all parties recognize 
that there are other and more important issues involved. 
Another example of the arbitrariness of the board is 
that despite Millard County School Distriot being among 
the poorer districts in the State of Utah, the board in-
tends to construct a new junior-senior high school at Delta 
at a cost of approximately $59,000 per classroom ·unit 
( $1,786,000 divided by 30) which is substantially above 
the average cost throughout the State of Utah per class .. 
room unit as shown by the evidence presented by defend~ 
ant's own witnesses. (Tr. 47) And the Court may, if it 
wishes, take judicial notice that on a cost per student ac-
tually enrolled basis, the projected cost of this Millard 
County project is comparatively very high. This is es-
pecially apparent when Superintendent Wright's reason-
ing is borne in mind -- that a junior high wing can rather 
economically be added to a high school because numerous 
fa.cilities such as the gymnasium, auditorium, shops, and 
home economics facilities need not be duplicated. (Tr. 8) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The respondents are aware that the Court was sub-
jected to numerous requests from both sides to hear and 
decide this case quickly, and that it felt constrained to do 
so because of the broad and important interests of the 
public which are involved. Nevertheless, while the re-
spondents concede the value of the adage that justice de-
layed- is justice denied, it is no less true that justice in too 
much of ·a hurry also may often result in a denial of jufY. 
tice- as it has in this case. It is highly important rtnat 
the Uourt should protect the balance of powers in govern-
ment and the meaningfulness and integrity of the ballot. 
It is equally important that a Supreme Court should not 
lightly indulge in the practice of upsetting the findings of 
fact of a trial court. We respectfully call these matters 
to the attention of the Court and urgently reques,t that re-
hearing be granted. 
Respecfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, ESQ. 
of Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkins 
A. LEE PETERSEN, ESQ. 
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